Justice Scalia\u27s Democratic Formalism by Sunstein, Cass R
Book Review
Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism
A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law By Antonin Scalia*
et al. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. Pp. xiii, 159. $19.95.
Cass R. Sunstein t
INTRODUCTION: RULE-BOUND JUSTICE AND THE STATUTORY STATE
In 1982, Guido Calabresi published a provocative book, A Common Law
for the Age of Statutes,' based on his Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law
School. Judge Calabresi's basic argument was that the common law has certain
virtues-above all, flexibility across time and space-that are at serious risk
in a statutory era.2 Judge Calabresi's central concern was to find a way to
import the values of common law judgment into a legal fabric governed by
statutory law. His most dramatic proposal was that courts should be given the
authority to declare statutes that were out of step with the prevailing legal
landscape void for "obsolescence."3 Judge Calabresi's particular proposal has
been very controversial, but it is of a piece with more standard views about
statutory construction having common law origins: judge-made exceptions to
plain language for absurd results; judicially developed "clear statement"
principles; judicial invocation of statutory purpose in a way reminiscent of a
precedent's "rationale"; judicial treatment of many statutes as the foundation
for judge-made common law; and "dynamic" statutory interpretation.' And
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1. GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)
2. See id. at 3-7.
3. Id. at 2.
4. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INIRPRETATION (1994)
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Judge Calabresi's views are reflected in the common law characteristics of
much constitutional law, characteristics which have given rise to a general
claim, usually meant as both description and praise, that constitutional law is
merely a species of Anglo-American common law.
The central essay in Justice Antonin Scalia's new book,6 based on his
Tanner Lectures at Princeton, offers an argument that is in many ways the
converse of Judge Calabresi's. Where Judge Calabresi sought to celebrate the
common law and to authorize courts to introduce far more of common law
thinking into a statutory era, Justice Scalia seeks to demote, even to exorcise,
the common law, to complain of its ascendancy in an age committed to the
principles of democratic government and the rule of law. Hence the essay's
title: Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System.7 In Justice Scalia's view,
the use of common law methods is simultaneously anachronistic and hubristic.
It is anachronistic because it is out of touch with the values and operations of
modern government.8 The charge of hubris is the more serious one. Justice
Scalia thinks that common law methods compromise democratic values, by
allowing judges an excessive role in policymaking.9 He also thinks that
common law methods introduce a high degree of unpredictability, increasing
judicial discretion and at the same time depriving others, citizens as well as
legislators, of a clear background against which to work.'"
Justice Scalia intends, then, to defend a species of democratic formalism.
We might even say that Justice Scalia is the clearest and most self-conscious
expositor of democratic formalism in the long history of American law. Justice
Scalia is a democrat in the sense that much of his jurisprudence is designed to
ensure that judgments are made by those with a superior democratic pedigree.
Above all, he seeks to develop rules of interpretation that will limit the
policymaking authority and decisional discretion of the judiciary, the least
accountable branch of government. Justice Scalia is a formalist in the particular
sense that he favors clear rules, seeks to treat statutory and constitutional texts
as rules, and distrusts the view that legal texts should be understood by
reference either to intentions or to canons of construction that live outside of
5. See HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 127 (1990); Harry H. Wellington,
Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 265-311 (1973); see also
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877-79 (1996).
6. A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann cd., 1997)
[hereinafter A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION]. The book consists of Justice Scalia's central essay;
commentaries of Gordon S. Wood, Laurence H. Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin; and a
reply from Justice Scalia. I focus on the central essay with occasional reference to the reply, though the
commentaries contain a good deal of interesting material.
7. See Antonin Scalia, Comnon-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 3.
8. See id. at 9.
9. See id. at 47.
10. See id. at 9-12.
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authoritative texts."1 Democratic formalism finds its interpretive foundation
in textualism. Thus Justice Scalia writes: "Of all the criticisms leveled against
textualism, the most mindless is that it is 'formalistic.' The answer to that is,
of course it's formalistic! The rule of law is about form ... Long live
formalism. It is what makes a government a government of laws and not of
men."'
12
As a judicial creed, democratic formalism is intelligible and coherent in
part because it argues in favor of interpretive principles and statutory default
rules that will create a clear background for Congress. in the process imposing
the right incentives on lawmakers. Justice Scalia's preferred default rules are
intended to make the law readily predictable and to ensure that Congress will
legislate in the constitutionally preferred fashion.
Where does all this leave the common law? For the democrat and for the
formalist, the common law raises many doubts. The common law, of course,
owes its content not to electoral processes but to decisions by people who are
mostly unelected. 3 And common law judges are free to eschew rules and to
act on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, the glory of the common law is often said
to consist in its particularism-its careful attention to the facts of the particular
case, its provision of an individualized hearing for each litigant.' " Justice
Scalia's attack on the common law legacy is thus rooted in distrust of
particularism-especially judicial particulaism-and in enthusiasm for rule-
bound interpretation that relies, in both statutory and constitutional
interpretation, on a single foundation: the meaning of the relevant legal text as
it was understood at the time of enactnent."
This is an elegant book, and it is a great pleasure to read. My central
objection is that Justice Scalia's argument on behalf of democratic formalism
does not come to terms with three important problems for democratic
formalism: the internal morality of the democratic ideal; the existence of
reasonable, alternative, nonformalist approaches to interpretation, designed to
limit judicial discretion, promote stability, and enhance democratic self-
1i. The best discussion of formalism is FREDERICK SCHAUER. PLAYING BY Tiff RULEs ( 1991) Schauer
sees that whether formalism makes sense depends on a pragmatic inquiry. promincntl) involving the
capacities of various institutions. See id. at 196-206 A dillerent kind of formalsm-the kind that makes
the term "formalism" appropriately an epithct-refers to the masking of a value judgment by relerencc to
a judgment of law that actually encodes the value judgment An especially good discussion of this type of
formalism is JOSEPH RAZ, ETHics IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 314-19 (1996)
12. Scalia, supra note 7, at 25
13. Justice Scalia is self-consciously a legal realist as well as a legal lormalist See id at 10 A
competing view would say that the common law has a democraic pedigree because and to the extent that
it simply tracks custom. There is an interesting current revival of attention to the role of norms and
genuinely customary law. See, e.g., ROBERT C ELLICKSON, ORDER WIDO7T LAW (1991)
14. See, e.g., EDWARD H, LEVI, AN INTRODUcTION TO LEGAL RI-.ASONING 4-6 (1949)
15. This view is traceable to Justice Holmes: "'WIe ask. not what Ithe authorl meant, but what those
words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English. using them in the circumstances in which
they were used .... Oliver Wendell Holmes. The Theorn of Legal hlterpreration. 12 HARv L REV 417.
417-18 (1899). The view is criticized, by an admirer of Holmes. in RICHARD A POSNER. THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 262-69 (1990).
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government; and (most surprising) the place of administrative agencies in the
structure of modem public law. It is not clear that democratic formalism
actually promotes democracy, rightly understood. Moreover, there are other
ways of limiting judicial power and judicial discretion, ways that are familiar
to, even constitutive of, the common law tradition as it has come to be
understood in the United States. The principal virtue of democratic formalism
is that it may be the best way of promoting predictability, 6 but even here
there are reasonable alternatives, and it is far from clear that predictability
trumps all other values.
In a short, vivid essay of this kind, originally presented as a public lecture,
Justice Scalia cannot be expected to have laid all doubts to rest, or to have
answered all questions in legal theory. But his defense of his own position
works too often by hyperbolic slippery slope arguments, by opposing
democratic formalism to positions that no one really holds, and most of all by
invoking the specter of untrammeled judicial control over political outcomes.
It is as if those who reject Justice Scalia's particular approach hope to give,
and inevitably will give, unelected judges the power to do whatever they wish.
But the choice between democratic formalism and the real alternatives calls for
more fine-grained and, in part, empirical judgments about the capacities of
real-world institutions. If, for example, judges interpret statutes in accordance
with the original meaning of their text, will legislative drafting be improved,
and will legislatures correct obvious mistakes? If judges do not use legislative
history, might ambiguous texts be interpreted by reference to the judges' own
views about policy and principle? If judges abandon the original understanding
of the constitutional text, are there alternative positions that would limit
judicial discretion and allow appropriate space for electoral politics? And just
what is the role of administrative agencies, which might, in a post-Chevron7
era, perform, and be authorized to perform, the role formerly carried out by
common law courts? Justice Scalia's silence on the last question is especially
disappointing: At this stage in American history, no treatment of legal
interpretation is complete if it neglects the enormous de facto and de jure
interpretive function of administrative agencies.
If a goal of a system of interpretation is to constrain judicial discretion,
and particularly if we attend to the role of regulatory agencies, it is far from
clear that Justice Scalia's approach is superior to the alternatives actually
favored by the American tradition of public law. And if (as Justice Scalia
rightly insists) a goal of a system of legal interpretation is to promote
democratic self-government, it is not at all clear that Justice Scalia's approach
16. Even thi§ is not clear because the original meaning may have involved a concept that would
change over time, and because there may be hard questions in deciding how to understand original meaning
when facts and values have changed. See infra text accompanying notes 137-144 (discussing FDA
regulation of tobacco products).
17. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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is better than that favored by our tradition, which uses interpretive principles
to promote democratic goals, not only in the area of statutory construction but
also in administrative and constitutional law. A great defect of democratic
formalism is that it identifies democracy with whatever happens to emerge
from majoritarian politics. If we insist (with the Constitution's Framers)'" that
there is a difference between a well-functioning system of deliberative
democracy and simple majoritarian politics, we may well favor principles of
interpretation that promote that very system, perhaps by allowing
administrative agencies some license to adjust text to circumstance, certainly
through "clear statement" principles, and not least by invalidating outcomes
that are inconsistent with what we might consider the internal morality of
democracy.
In any case, this will be my basic argument here. Part I summarizes Justice
Scalia's essay. Part II deals with the topic of statutory interpretation-Justice
Scalia's particular passion and the highlight of his essay here. This part
outlines the stakes, explores the great case of Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, 9 and examines the role of administrative agencies in legal
interpretation. Its principal theme is that Justice Scalia's discussion neglects the
possibility that administrative agencies can discharge some of the functions of
common law courts without compromising democratic values. Part III explores
the Constitution. It argues that the interests in ensuring stability, constraining
judicial discretion, and promoting democratic self-government do argue for
some version of the principles of stare decisis and judicial restraint, but not the
particular form of originalism favored by Justice Scalia.
I. AGAINST THE COMMON LAW
The principal essay in A Matter of Interpretation comes in three parts. The
first part is an attack on the common law. The second part is a discussion of
statutory interpretation. The third part deals with constitutional law.
A. Broken-Field Runners
Justice Scalia's discussion of the common law is sharp, clever, and at
times hilarious. In some ways it amounts to an indictment of legal education.
Justice Scalia thinks that the first year of law school has "an enormous impact
upon the mind,"' and much of that impact comes from the student's
immersion in judge-made common law. There is a difference, for Justice
Scalia, between law that is common in the sense of "customary" and law that
18. See WiLU~Am BESsETrE, THE MILD VoicE oF RFASON 6-46 (1994) (dtscussmng the premium placd
by the Framers on democratic deliberation and rellection)
19. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
20. Scalia, supra note 7, at 3.
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is "common" in the sense that it is the creation of judges. That latter form of
law is not created through practice but is the stuff of law schools,
hypotheticals, and analogical thinking:
What intellectual fun all of this is! It explains why first-year law
school is so exhilarating: because it consists of playing common-law
judge, which in turn consists of playing king-devising, out of the
brilliance of one's own mind, those laws that ought to govern
mankind. How exciting!
2'
The student comes to have a distinctive picture of the great judge, with a large
influence on American legal culture, as-the person
who has the intelligence to discern the best rule of law for the case
at hand and then the skill to perform the broken-field running through
earlier cases that leaves him free to impose that rule: distinguishing
one prior case on the left, straight-arming another one on the right,
high-stepping away from another precedent about to tackle him from
the rear, until (bravo!) he reaches the goal-good law.22
What is wrong with this picture? Justice Scalia thinks that the problem is
simple: "a trend in government that has developed in recent centuries, called
democracy. ' 23 Legal realism has taught us what is now obvious, that common
law judges make and do not find law. This does not mean the common law
should be eliminated from its own domain, but it does mean the attitude of
common law judges is inappropriate for most of the work of federal judges
and much of the work of state judges. 24 "We live in an age of legislation, and
most new law is statutory law."5 And the common law method has two basic
problems. First, it is insufficiently democratic, since it threatens rule by
judges.26 Second, the common law method is insufficiently formal, because
it is too highly particularistic, too unpredictable, too rule-free.
27
B. "What a Waste"
Justice Scalia brings these points to bear on the topic of statutory
interpretation, a real highlight of the book and clearly one of his passions.28
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id. at 9.
23. Id.
24. Many state court judges are, of course, elected. Justice Scalia does not say how this might bear
on his argument.
25. Scalia, supra note 7, at 13.
26. See id. at 9, 47.
27. See id. at 6-12.
28. Justice Scalia deplores what he sees as an absence of academic attention to statutory interpretation,
an odd view in light of the recent outpouring of work on that subject, inspired above all by William
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His basic complaint is that American judges and academics 'are unconcerned
with the fact that we have no intelligible theory" of statutory construction. "'
His central claim is that what matters is the objective meaning of the text, not
the subjective intentions of Congress. "It is the law that governs, not the intent
of the lawgiver."" Interpretation actually turns on "a sort of 'objectified'
intent-the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the
law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris."" Because subjective
intent is so murky, Justice Scalia thinks that its use risks substitution of
judicial policy preferences for those of the legislature.
His case in chief in this regard is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States.32 There the Court held, contrary to the apparently plain language of
the governing statute banning the importation of foreign labor, that a church
could pay for the transportation of a rector to the United States." Justice
Scalia reads Holy Trinity (not at all unreasonably) as a case about the
substitution of legislative intent for text. In his view, what the church did
violated "the letter of the statute, and was therefore within the statute: end of
case." Thus Justice Scalia adopts textualism. But he offers two important
clarifications. First, he disfavors "strict construction": "I am not a strict
constructionist, and no one ought to be .... " Textualists give to the text
its ordinary meaning, construing it neither broadly nor narrowly. Nor does
Justice Scalia favor literalism.36 He emphasizes that meaning is a function of
context. What he urges is that courts should refuse to go beyond the range of
meaning offered by a reasonable understanding of statutory terms, taken in
their context.
Justice Scalia is aware that some cases involve a fairly wide range of
textual meanings, and that the text can leave ambiguities. What aids are
permissible? It is entirely acceptable to interpret statutory terms with structural
aids, resolving ambiguities so as to make statutes both internally consistent and
consistent with previously enacted laws. His textualism is thus supplemented
with the structure of the relevant statute and indeed the structure of the law as
a whole.
37
Eskridge and Philip Fnckey. See ESKRIDGE. 3tpra note 4. WILLA,i N ESKRIiDGI-. JR & PHILIP P
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION STATL-IS AND Tlu- CRi-ATioN 0F PLBLIC PoLIC" (2d
ed. 1995).
29. Scalia, supra note 7, at 14
30. Id. at 17.
31. Id.
32. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
33. See id. at 472: see also infra text accompanying notes 75-78
34. Scalia, 3upra note 7. at 20
35. Id. at 23.
36. See id. at 24
37. See id. at 16-17:.see albo Antonin Scalia. Repoin3e. in A MATI-R oi- rITI-RPRETATION. 3upra note
6, at 134. Page 134 offers a gloss on pages 16-17. in response to Tribe's commentarN See Laurence iH
Tribe, Comment, in A NATTER OF INTERPRETATION. aupra note 6. at 81
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Justice Scalia also defends canons of construction as legitimate and helpful
to the extent that they are common sense ways of understanding the meaning
of text. This is true of the ancient canons with Latin names, such as the old
favorite, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of the one is
exclusion of the other). In urging the use of such canons, Justice Scalia takes
a stand against Karl Llewellyn's famous attempt to demolish the canons by
showing that for every canon there is an equal canon pointing in the opposite
direction.3" Justice Scalia says, very reasonably, that there are not really
opposites on almost every point, and he thinks that the most that Llewellyn has
shown is that the canons are not absolute,39 which is not exactly news.
Justice Scalia is much less enthusiastic about substantive canons and
presumptions, as in the idea that courts should construe statutes favorably to
Native Americans, leniently on behalf of criminal defendants, narrowly if they
are in derogation of the common law, narrowly if they waive sovereign
immunity, and so forth. For textualists, substantive canons are "a lot of
trouble." They lack clear legitimacy (because it is not clear where courts get
the authority to use them), and they have indeterminate weight, thus increasing
the unpredictability and possible arbitrariness of judicial decision. On the other
hand, some substantive presumptions may be reasonable if they attempt to get
at meaning or if they have the warrant of antiquity. Thus, extraordinary acts,
like the congressional elimination of state sovereign immunity or perhaps the
waiver of sovereign immunity, require a clear statement, because that is what
one would expect were extraordinary acts intended. And the rule of lenity may
be justified by its age. But others, like the rule that statutes in derogation of
the common law will be narrowly construed, look like "a sheer judicial power-
grab.
' 41
For a long time, Justice Scalia has been critical of judicial use of
legislative history.42 Here he makes two central points. First, legislative intent
is not the proper basis of interpretation, and hence legislative history focuses
judicial attention on the wrong question,43 away from meaning and toward
subjective understandings of meaning. Second, use of history involves a lot of
time and expense, and it is "more likely to produce a false or contrived
legislative intent than a genuine one."" This is because there is in 99.99% of
cases no such thing, and the archives are unreliable in any case. "In the only
case I recall in which, had I followed legislative history, I would have come
38. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of Canons
About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950).
39. See Scalia, supra note 7, at 27.
40. Id. at 28.
41. Id. at 29.
42. See, e.g., Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
43. See Scalia, supra note 7, at 31.
44. Id. at 32.
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out the other way, the rest of my colleagues (who did use legislative history)
did not come out the other way either.... What a waste."5
C. "A Rock-Solid, Unchanging Constitution"
Constitutional interpretation, for Justice Scalia, is a place not for special
principles but for the usual ones just described. His basic argument is that the
Constitution's meaning is set not by the original intention but by the original
meaning of its text. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison receive attention
not because they were Framers whose subjective intentions matter, but because
they (no more than John Jay and Thomas Jefferson, who were not Framers)
can help us identify the original meaning. For Justice Scalia, originalism
opposes those who think, in common law fashion, that the Constitution is
"living" and should be understood by reference to "current" meaning.' The
notion of a "living constitution" is an invitation to the broken-field running
characteristic of common law thinking, or decision by reference to cases
instead of authoritative text. Justice Scalia particularly deplores the fact that
constitutional law is made after consulting recent cases rather than original
intention. For Justice Scalia, the result is "a common-law way of making law,
and not the way of construing a democratically adopted text."'47 The
consequence is that the Constitution means whatever the judges think it should
mean.
Against the view that the "living constitution" is necessary to promote
flexibility over time, Justice Scalia argues that the "living constitution"
approach actually reduces the capacity for democratic experimentation, by
allowing judges to prevent elected officials from engaging in new
experiments.48 Against the view that the "living constitution" is necessary to
protect an ample category of rights, Justice Scalia argues that it need not
increase the category of rights at all. In many cases-property rights, Second
Amendment rights,49 Confrontation Clause rights--originalism offers a
more expansive rather than less expansive understanding of rights." That
understanding may be ill-suited to current social desires. But it is emphatically
not a truncated understanding of rights.
Justice Scalia's fundamental objections to a common law understanding of
the Constitution are that it lacks legitimacy and that it is too discretionary.
Freed from the original meaning, judges consult their own judgments of policy
45. Id. at 36-37.
46. See id. at 38.
47. Id. at 40.
48. See id. at 42.
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. II. It is especially noteworthy--even news--hat Justice Scalia que.tiuns
the constitutional validity of gun control laws at the national lcvcl See Scalia. .iupra note 7. ,at 43
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 2.
51. See Scalia, supra note 7, at 43-44.
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and principle and are effectively untethered. "[T]here is no agreement, and no
chance of agreement, upon what is to be the guiding principle of the
evolution., 52 To be sure, originalists disagree among themselves; history can
be ambiguous and, importantly, as Justice Scalia notes, there are questions
about applying the original meaning to "new and unforeseen phenomena," such
as sound trucks and television.53 But these are minor problems compared to
those raised when people who, believing in a "living constitution," take the
Constitution to mean what it should and hence authorize judges to understand
the Constitution to be whatever "the majority wants."54 "This, of course, is
the end of the Bill of Rights, whose meaning will be committed to the very
body it was meant to protect against: the majority. By trying to make the
Constitution do everything that needs doing ... we shall have caused it to do
nothing at all." 55
II. STATUTES, CONTEXTS, AND CLEAR STATEMENTS
A. Interpretive Goals: Decisional Burdens, Stability, Democracy, and
Restraint
What are the goals of Justice Scalia's approach to interpretation? 56 One
goal is to reduce the sheer costs of decision, so that the burden on courts and
litigants is relatively low. A closely related goal is to make law relatively
certain and predictable, so that people know where they stand and do not have
to puzzle much over the content of law. Yet another goal is to control the
discretion of those institutions whom we trust least or fear most. A system of
interpretation might well be designed to reduce the role of courts in
establishing social policies or governing principles, certainly if it seems that
courts ought not to be entrusted with that kind of business. 7 Justice Scalia
thinks that his version of textualism will effectively control judicial power,
while at the same time increasing the policymaking primacy of the legislature,
in part by giving it appropriate incentives. If, for example, legislative history
will not be used, legislators will be under considerable pressure to increase
52. Id. at 45.
53. Id. at 45; see also Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelty and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REv. 395 (1995) (arguing that maintaining interpretive fidelity with past understandings of the
Constitution may require adapting old readings to new social reality). I do not discuss that kind of objection
here, though some of what I say below bears on it. See infra text accompanying notes 137-146.
54. Scalia, supra note 7, at 47.
55. Id.
56. 1 do not discuss here the suggestion that a theory of interpretation is appropriately rooted in a
theory of authority or the accompanying claim that reference to lawmaker intention is therefore a part of
the appropriate theory of interpretation. See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 113-
23 (1992). Scalia's general approach might be aided by assessing claims of this sort.
57. Some people, of course, think that courts have comparative advantages at least on the question of
principles. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 23-33 (1962); RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 375 (1986).
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statutory clarity. These points are about reducing the burdens of decision and
the costs of uncertainty.
But Justice Scalia seeks most fundamentally to promote democratic self-
government and the primacy of the system of lawmaking set out in Article I
of the Constitution. The reduction of judicial discretion via textualism serves
both of these fundamental goals. 58 In so doing, democratic formalism ensures
that statutory and constitutional provisions will not be given "spirits" and
"purposes" attributable to the (unenacted) political morality of any particular
era. A ban on "dynamic" interpretation, and a requirement of fidelity to
enacted law, ensures that courts will not bow to political will or bend statutes
to prevailing political winds except to the extent that they have produced actual
legislation.5 9
It is worth speculating about why and how Justice Scalia, educated at
Harvard Law School in the era of Hart and Sacks,' actually came to this
position. Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, of course, saw continuity between the
common law and statutory interpretation; they placed a large emphasis on the
collaborative role of courts, not least in the process of statutory interpretation,
which they thought was best rooted in identification of statutory "purpose,"
supplemented by an array of judge-made clear statement principles."' Justice
Scalia has suggested that years ago he was sympathetic to this position, or at
least to judicial particularism. 6 2 We may speculate"t that Justice Scalia's
self-professed shift in view may have emerged from the nation's experience
with both particularism and purposive interpretation in the period between, say,
1965 and the present. In this period, particularism occasionally has produced
a high degree of confusion, as case-by-case decisions allow judges to have
58. Note in this regard that after World War II, Bnitain and America responded to Natism In pan b)
ensuring that such laws as had been enacted in the Hitler penod and had not been soidcd s,,re to be
interpreted "in accordance 'with the plain meaning of the text and without regard to oblectiies or meanings
ascribed in preambles or other pronouncements."' INGOO MILU--R, Hi-tR's JusTc- at ,i( 1991) (omitting
citation). Note also Muller's demonstration that the principal technique used b% Hitler's judges Va5
emphatically antiformalist, a form of purposive. dynamic statutory construction intended to link statutorS
meaning with prevailing ideals. See id. at 92, 104-05. 117
59. Miller's book is a good warning in this regard See it
60. See geterally HENRY M. HART. JR & ALBF.RT NI SACKS. THE LFGAL PROCI-Ss William N
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958)
61. See id. at 1111-380. For an outstanding statement of the central organi.ing themes. see u at 1374-
80. To get a sense of its flavor, consider the following
In interpreting a statute a court should:
1. Decide what purpose ought to be attnbuted to the statute and to an% suboidinate pro~tston
of it which may be involved; and then
2. Interpret the words of the statute immediately in question so as to .air) out the purptsc as
best it can, making sure, however, that it does not give the words either-
(a) a meaning they will not bear, or
(b) a meaning which would violate any established polic% o clear statement
Id. at 1374.
62. See Antonin Scalia. The Rule of La% as o Lau of Rule3. 56 U CHI L Ri-v 1175, 1177 ( 1989)
63. Speculation of this kind risks recklessness It what is said in this paragraph does not reflect Justice
Scalia's own experience, at least it might be said to reflect the possible expenente of some people
disaffected with the use of statutory purpose or with common law decisionmaking in public lass
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continuing room to maneuver and make predictability hard to maintain.
Perhaps even worse, resort to statutory and, above all, constitutional purpose
has led Justices in directions that, by Justice Scalia's lights, must seem highly
ideological-much less a matter of finding something than a matter of making
things up.64 And what is made up might well seem to reflect the views of a
"new class" of intellectuals having political commitments very different from
those of Justice Scalia himself and perhaps the nation as a whole.
In brief: When particularism and purposivism invite courts to take stands
on the great issues of the day, or on "Kulturkampf,"65 formalism reemerges
as an appealing alternative.66 A shift from particularism and purposivism to
formalism represents a natural odyssey for students of Hart and Sacks,
disappointed by personal experience with an apparently ideological,
particularistic, and purposive judiciary, and seeking to impose sharp constraints
on judicial discretion.67 Some help in this regard emerges from work in
cognitive psychology suggesting that people often overstate the value of case-
by-case, intuitionistic judgments, and understate the value of (admittedly
somewhat crude) rules.68
What I will be arguing here is that, despite appearances, Justice Scalia's
argument cannot really rely on abstract or a priori claims about Article I of the
Constitution or on arguments about democratic rule.69 Those claims do not
support Justice Scalia's distinctive approach. Instead, that approach must be
defended by a set of pragmatic and empirical claims about various
governmental institutions and how those institutions are likely to respond to
64. See, e.g., O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353, 2361-62 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 156 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). These are recent cases, but the same general
point holds, for many observers, as the general symbol of the Warren Court.
65. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also MOLLER, supra note 58, at 4-5
(discussing Hitler's judges).
66. Indeed, a characteristic response to a perceived failure of purposive interpretation is formalism,
whereas another response involves general claims of indeterminacy or of the illusory character of the
distinction between law and politics. It will emerge from the discussion that I believe both of these
responses are inadequate.
67. See MOLLER, supra note 58, at 39-119, for a valuable discussion of the role of purposive
interpretation in extending the agenda of the Nazi party. The German judges read longstanding statutes
consistently with the prevailing political order, both purposively and dynamically, in a way that very much
promoted Hitler's goals. MUlIler's book is a valuable warning about the ideological uses of purposive
interpretation and the possible advantages, from the standpoint of liberty, of formalism; it casts Scalia's
argument in a vividly appealing light. If formalism is less appealing for America than it was for Germany
during or immediately after the Nazi era, it is because of America's common law tradition, which embeds
an enduring political morality that can hardly be treated as a transient pathology, and which contains values
that are compatible with both democracy and the rule of law. Consider, for example, background principles
requiring criminal statutes to be construed leniently, see, e.g., United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 305-06
(1992), or so as not to raise serious constitutional doubts, see, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128-30
(1958). I am grateful to Richard Pildes for referring me to Maller's book and for helpful discussion of the
issues in this paragraph.
68. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, 7Tnid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive
Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 19-20 (1993).
69. Cf Scalia, supra note 7, at 9, 14-17.
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different interpretive strategies. Justice Scalia does not defend those pragmatic
and empirical claims. Thus, he has not shown that his approach is preferable
to reasonable alternatives, including those that stress the role of administrative
agencies in the modem state.
The most basic point is that no context-free view of legal interpretation
will make much sense. 7' And while judgments about the future are inevitably
speculative, America's own experience, with its distinctive history, suggests
that democratic formalism is likely to be inferior to the alternatives actually
favored by the American legal tradition. 7' We might take this to be a neo-
Burkean point, intended as a challenge to Justice Scalia's neo-Benthamite
attack on the common law.72
It is highly revealing in this connection that there is a substantial overlap
between the interpretive practices of common law and civil law courts, each
of which uses similar presumptions and canons, not only linguistic but also
substantive.73 Thus, Justice Scalia's attack on common law practices cannot
easily survive an encounter with civil law systems, whose courts are only
intermittently textualist, and which are permeated by interpretive practices of
the kind he disfavors.74
70. This is a lesson of P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SuMMi.Rs. FOR.M AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW 298-335 (1987). which connects different styles of interpretation to differences in
legislatures in America and England.
71. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in lnterpretung Statutes. 65 S CAL L
REv. 845, 868-74 (1992), for a similar conclusion on a point stressed by Justice Scalia One qualification
is necessary: Our own legal tradition has yet to come to terms with the sca-change inaugurated by the rise
of administrative agencies, and that development calls for some new analysts. See infra text accompanying
notes 123-125. It is here, for example, that Judge Calabresi's proposal might be faulted on the ground that
the principal updating role should come from regulatory agencies Bur see CALABRESi. supra note I. at 56
("To allow the truly dependent agency to act to update our laws would, in fact, be to cut through our
checks and balances by allowing a majoritarian but unrestrained executive to enforce its vievs of the
popular will .... ").
72. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 925-34. For Justice Scalia's approving discussion of the codification
movement, see Scalia, supra note 7, at 11-12. Bentham's own view on the role of common law
particularism was quite complex. See GERALD POSTEMIA. BEN'HAM AND THE COMiMON LAw TRADmITON
440-64 (1986).
73. See Massimo La Torre et al., Statutory Interpretation in Italy. in INTERPREINo STATUTES 213.
222 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds.. 1991): D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S Summers.
Interpretation and Justification, in INTERPRETING STATUrS. supra. at 511. 514-15. 518-21. 535-39. Robert
S. Summers & Michele Taruffo. Interpretation and Comparative Analysis. in IrT-.RPRETING STATUTI.S.
supra, at 461, 468-69, 485-86.
74. See, e.g., Aulis Aamio, Statutory Interpretation in Finland. in INTERPRETING STATUTES, supra note
73, at 123, 142-43; Robert Alexy & Ralf Dreicr, Statutory Interpretation tn the Federal Republic of
Germany, in INTERPRETING STATUTES. supra note 73. at 73. 90; La Torte et al ,supra note 73. at 213. 222-
23, 244; Michel Troper et. al., Statutory Interpretation iit France, tii INTERPRI-.ING STATUTI-S. supra note
73, at 171, 189; see also Summers & Taruffo, supra note 73. at 485 (suggesting that when there is "a
conflict between an argument from ordinary or technical meaning, on the one hand. and the argument that
this meaning leads to an absurd or manifestly unjust result, on the other." the "latter argument is recognized
in virtually every system in our study, though not always in the same form"), id at 486 (suggesting that
"[w]ithin limits, the higher courts of all countries in our study adjust the ordinary or technical meaning of
a statute to take due account of its datedness or obsolescence Iso] Itihe theory would appear to be that the
force or weight of any 'old' meaning is outweighed").
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B. Holy Trinity, Excessive Generality, and Presumptions
Let us approach these points by focusing on Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States,75 Justice Scalia's bete noire. The Holy Trinity case raises a
large number of the issues dealt with in Justice Scalia's discussion of statutory
interpretation; by discussing Holy Trinity, we can discuss many of the issues
raised in the book. In 1885, largely in response to an influx of immigrant
labor, Congress made it unlawful
for any person, company, partnership, or corporation, in any manner
whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or
encourage the importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any
foreigner or foreigners, into the United States ... under contract or
agreement, parol or special, express or implied, made previous to the
importation or migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or
foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in the United
States .... 76
The problem arose because the Church of the Holy Trinity made a contract
with E. Walpole Warren, an alien residing in England, to pay for his
transportation to the United States, where he was to work as a rector and
pastor. The United States claimed that the church had acted unlawfully.77 The
Supreme Court disagreed. It said that the text of the statute was not
controlling.78
The Court's opinion was very complex, with multiple strands. It can be
read in three different ways, each with support in the opinion itself.
(1) General language will not be taken to produce an outcome that would,
in context, be absurd, at least if there is no affirmative evidence that this result
was intended by the enacting legislature.
[F]requently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words
broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of
the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such
broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the
legislator intended to include the particular act.79
On this view, Holy Trinity is a rerun of the famous case of Riggs v. Palmer,"
in which the New York Court of Appeals held that a statute governing
75. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
76. Id. at 458.
77. See id. at 458.
78. See id. at 472.
79. Id. at 459.
80. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
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inheritance would not be interpreted to allow a nephew to inherit from his
uncle's will when the uncle's death resulted from his murder at the nephew's
hands.8
(2) General language will not be taken to produce an outcome that was
clearly not intended by the enacting legislature, as those intentions are revealed
by context, including legislative history.
[A]nother guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the evil
which it is designed to remedy; and for this the court properly looks
at contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was
pressed upon the attention of the legislative body ...
. . . It appears . .. in the testimony presented before the
committees of Congress, that it was this cheap unskilled labor which
was making the trouble ....
... We find, therefore, that the title of the act, the evil which was
intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to
Congress, the reports of the committee of each house, all concur in
affirming that the intent of Congress was simply to stay the influx of
this cheap unskilled labor.8 2
On this view, Holy Trinity advocates legislative history and consideration of
legislative intent.
(3) General language will not be taken to depart from longstanding social
understandings and practices, at least or especially if the departure would raise
serious constitutional doubts.
[N]o purpose of action against religion can be imputed to any
legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people. This
is historically true. ...
[ . . S]hall it be believed that a Congress of the United States
intended to make it a misdemeanor for a church of this country to
contract for the services of a Christian minister residing in another
nation?83
On this view, the background tradition of religious liberty operates as a "clear
statement" principle, one that requires Congress to speak unambiguously if it
wishes to intrude on that tradition. Congress will not be taken to have barred
a church from paying for the transportation of a rector unless there is
affirmative evidence that Congress intended to do precisely that. Congress will
not be taken to have interfered with religious liberty through inadvertence or
loose language.
81. See id. at 191.
82. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 463-65,
83. Id. at 465,471.
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Justice Scalia appears to think that each of these three principles is wrong,
certainly as applied to Holy Trinity.84 Let us take up these principles in turn.
Understood according to principle (I), Holy Trinity presents a familiar,
even mundane problem, that is, the problem introduced by linguistic generality.
In a famous passage, Wittgenstein describes the problem in this way:
"Someone says to me: 'Shew [sic] the children a game.' I teach them gaming
with dice, and the other says, 'I didn't mean that sort of game.' Must the
exclusion of the game with dice have come before his mind when he gave me
the order?"85
Wittgenstein's clear implication is that it need not. In daily
communication, and without thinking about it, we carve out exceptions from
general language;86 we do not consult the dictionary meaning of the words
and act in accordance with what we find there. It is tempting to respond that
there is a difference between daily communication and a legislative command;
perhaps the latter should be presumed not to be sloppy. But this response
misses the point, which has nothing to do with sloppiness and everything to
do with the cognitive limits of human beings. Because of the inevitable
limitations of human foresight, even the most carefully chosen words can
become unclear because and not in spite of their generality.87 Textualists who
fail to see this point can be found only in science fiction novels populated by
androids and aliens,88 whose misunderstandings and befuddlement are a direct
consequence of their textualism. Now, Justice Scalia is not a literalist; he is at
84. There is some doubt about whether he sees a limited place for principles (2) and (3) in general.
See Scalia, supra note 7, at 20 n.22 (acknowledging a role for principle (3) but seeing it as inapplicable
to Holy Trinity); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing for statutory interpretation based on context, ordinary usage, and
compatibility with surrounding law).
85. LUDWIG WITGENsTEIN, PHILosOPHIcA. INVESTIGATIONS 33 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., MacMillan
1960) (1953).
86. In ordinary communication, we do not think of it as making "exceptions." It all happens very
quickly and naturally. For example, "Don't bother me during the next hour" (but what if the house catches
fire?), or "Clean up your room completely" (but what if a certain level of messiness is standard in the
family?).
87. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-36 (2d ed. 1994). As Hart writes:
[W]e are men, not gods; it is a feature of the human predicament (and so of the legislative one)
that we labour under two connected handicaps whenever we seek to regulate, unambiguously
and in advance, some sphere of conduct by means of general standards to be used without
further official direction on particular occasions. The first handicap is our relative ignorance of
fact; the second is our relative indeterminacy of aim. If the world in which we live were
characterized only by a finite number of features, and these together with all the modes in
which they combine were known to us, then provision could be made in advance for every
possibility .... Plainly this world is not our world; human legislators can have no such
knowledge of all possible combinations of circumstances which the future may bring. This
inability to anticipate things brings with it a relative indeterminacy of aim.
Id. at 128.
88. Cf. POSNER, supra note 15, at 268 ("A normal English speaker does not interpret a message merely
by consulting the dictionary definitions of each word (assume these definitions are stored in his brain) and
the relevant grammatical and syntactical principles."). Science fiction enthusiasts may wish to consider Star




pains to distinguish textualism from literalism, and he knows that the meaning
of text is a function of context. But once we insist on that point, just why is
principle (1) so bad? Why is it not an ordinary application of the idea that the
meaning of words depends on context?
Perhaps Justice Scalia would respond that this principle increases the costs
of decisions for judges; perhaps an approach that takes Congress "at its word"
produces more mechanical (simpler, more predictable) jurisprudence. Perhaps
Justice Scalia would add that absurdity is in the eye of the beholder, so that
principle (I) also introduces risks of error in the form of judicial misjudgments
about what counts as absurd. And perhaps Justice Scalia would insist that
Congress would respond well to his approach to Holy Trinity. Knowledge of
judicial refusal to make exceptions for absurdity might increase legislative care
with drafting and thus decrease excessive generality before the fact. Or perhaps
Congress would respond promptly and effectively to mistakes introduced by
excessive generality; Congress would therefore correct the outcome in Holy
Trinity if it really objects. 9 If all this is true, Justice Scalia's approach would
produce few mistakes, and those mistakes that it does produce would find easy
correction.90
If we understand Justice Scalia's argument to be defensible in these
terms, 9' the debate over principle (1) is really a debate about the costs of
decision and the costs of error.92 More particularly, it is a special case of the
debate over rules and standards. The Holy Trinity Court treated the text of the
statute as a kind of standard, inviting inquiry into underlying purposes. Justice
Scalia wants to treat it as a kind of rule, fully specifying outcomes in advance.
The dispute cannot be resolved on the basis of abstractions." It is better to
ask about which approach will (roughly speaking) minimize the costs of
decision and the costs of error. Justice Scalia can be taken to suggest that his
approach will reduce the sum of aggregate decision costs and aggregate error
costs, and under imaginable assumptions, he is entirely right.
89. Relevant evidence of congressional rejection of judicial interpretation can be found in William N
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory hiterpreration Dectwor. 101 YALE LJ 331 (1991)
90. Note here the relatively formalistic nature of statutory interpretation in England and the distinctive
context in which that formalism may make sense. highly professional drafting and a responsive Parliament
ready and willing to correct errors after they have arisen See ATYAH & SuhistiFRS. supra note 70. at 104.
315-23.
91. For proposition (1), Article I of the Constitution is a red hernng, the question is what the relevant
statute means.
92. There are of course qualitative differences among the vaious kinds of errors, and judgments must
be made about which errors are worst, both qualitatively and quantitatively There is also a question about
what counts as an error at all. Perhaps Justice Scalia would contend that his
approach-textualism-produces no errors. But this begs the question by defining errors as whatever
emerges from other approaches. To be sure, it is not clear that errors can be defined as such apirt from
some antecedent account of appropriate interpretation I am attempting to build on the common intuition
that an interpreter blunders if he interprets a word to produce an outcome that would generally be taken
as absurd.
93. The same conclusion can be found in SCHAUVER. 3upra note I1. at 222-28. which delends
formalism as a possible approach to interpretation
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But are the assumptions correct? This is far from obvious. Perhaps a
judicial role of the sort suggested in Holy Trinity will not introduce much
uncertainty; perhaps cases in which textual generality produces absurdity are
few in number and easily recognized as such. If so, principle (1) may not
much increase decision costs, and it may greatly reduce error (understood as
such if the outcome would be by general agreement absurd). And perhaps it
is very hard for legislatures to anticipate cases of this kind in advance-and
also costly and complex for legislatures, with so much business to transact, to
spend all the resources necessary to fix the errors of excessive generality.
Formalism may decrease costs at the judicial level while also increasing costs,
perhaps dramatically, at the legislative level. If all this is true, Holy Trinity is
right as an example of principle (1).
If we are talking about the modem state, it makes sense to say that
administrative agencies should be permitted to act as the Court did in Holy
Trinity (a point to which I will return94). And a reasonable assessment of the
practical issues would suggest that courts should feel free to make exceptions
for applications that seem unquestionably absurd. Then the question would be
whether the application in Holy Trinity falls in that category. To know that, we
have to know some cjetails, but certainly it cannot be said that the outcome is
implausible or an abuse.
Justice Scalia is correct in objecting to principle (2) if he understands that
principle to suggest that clearly expressed legislative history (in, for example,
committee reports) should trump clearly expressed text. He is also right to say
that the text, and not the history, is the law; no one should doubt that point.
And it is sensible for Justice Scalia to insist on a distinction between
subjective intent (something actually in the minds of legislators) and
"objectified intent," understood as "the intent that a reasonable person would
gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus
juris.' 95 But suppose that we do not trouble ourselves with the complexities
of psychological inquiry into the subjective intentions of collective
decisionmaking bodies, and suppose that we use legislative history only in
cases of interpretive doubt, not because it is "the law" but because it helps
identify the meaning of the law. Suppose too that interpretive doubt can be
created either by ambiguous terms or by what appears to be excessive
generality. Here legislative history would matter for the same reason that
Madison and Hamilton matter. Words are hard to understand without some
conception of their purpose, and the distinction between purpose and intention
(suitably "objectified") is thin.
Indeed, textualism itself cannot do without some crucial subjective
elements. Recall that meaning is, for Justice Scalia, to be determined by
94. See infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
95. Scalia, supra note 7, at 17.
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exploring what was commonly understood at the time of enactment. But
common understandings are best uncovered by figunng out what people
thought. Thus the movement from "intentions" to "ineaning," while entirely
sensible, is not a movement from something (entirely) subjective to something
(entirely) objective. If the question is what relevant people understood a term
to mean, legislative history may well be useful. Of course, legislative history
should not be used when it is uninformative, or when it is so extensive and
broad that a judge is using it not to figure out what Congress meant, but
instead to support judicial policy preferences. Of course the text has priority,
and it is right to insist that what appears in the legislative history may be the
view of one side in a debate, or of a private interest group unable to get its
way with Congress.97 But these points do not support a bar on use of
legislative history; they lead in the direction of pragmatism and caution."
Justice Scalia's suggestion that the use of legislative history is akin to
"posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they could not easily be read""
is certainly relevant, but standing alone it cannot carry much weight. Citizens
do not always have easy access to statutory text (ask a nonlawyer neighbor to
track down 42 U.S.C. § 7521j)(2)(B)(ii), by, say, tomorrow morning), and
those who can find the text can often, without expending a lot more effort, find
the history. And where there are amnbiguities and doubts, might it not be better
to look at legislative history than to consult dictionaries, or one's own views
about policy and principle, at least if the ordinary meaning of the term, taken
in its context, is what governs? Why might not legislative history be useful in
showing that the term in question is not sensibly interpreted to cover the
problem at hand?
These questions need hardly be taken as decisive. We can imagine a world
in which resort to legislative history would be more trouble than it is worth,
because courts and legislatures, in that world, would respond well if courts
relied only on text and applicable canons of construction. In that imaginable
world, legislative history would not be very helpful (because it would be
impossibly ambiguous); courts would use legislative history to reach the results
that they liked best, which (let us suppose) would be independently very bad;
and the use of legislative history would have unfortunate effects on the
legislature by discouraging it from legislating clearly. Perhaps some state court
systems do not use legislative history for this reason,'" and what Justice
Scalia says helps support their practice. But we can also imagine a legal
96. See supra text accompanying note 15
97. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T HASSL-R. CLAN COAtJDIRTY AIR I0N.09 (1981). for
a good example.
98. See Breyer, supra note 71, at 847-60
99. Scalia, supra note 7, at 17
100. Cf., e.g., GWENDOLYN B. FoLsoM,. LEGISLATIV HISTORY RIE-S.ARCN Rmnt DINT-RPRiTATiON
OF LAWS 5 (1972) ("Use of legislative history by the state courts has .one more sloppI and is still much
less extensive than in the federal courts ")
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culture in which legislative history helps to discipline judges, by giving them
a sense of context and purpose, without creating serious problems at the
legislative stage. There is no way to know whether, in the abstract, the use of
legislative history is good or bad. So long as courts proceed sensibly, first
principles involving political legitimacy cannot resolve that question. Whether
it makes sense to use legislative history depends on such issues as the simple
costs of using the history, the likelihood that it will increase rather than
decrease errors, the availability of other more reliable sources of meaning, and
the consequences for the legislature itself of using legislative history or not
using it.
Justice Scalia is convincing in urging that legislative text and structure
deserve priority. He is right to say that courts have often misused legislative
history and that the use of history can increase costs of decision while also
creating more rather than fewer mistakes. Certainly a movement in the
direction of a firm judicial principle of textual primacy would make a good
deal of sense."' But he has not demonstrated that where other sources of
meaning leave doubt, courts should not consult legislative history. Perhaps a
legal system starting from scratch would do best to forbid courts from
consulting history. Perhaps American public law would be better if a ban on
the use of history were enacted; this is far from implausible. But in light of our
longstanding traditions, a dramatic shift of the sort proposed by Justice Scalia
bears a heavy burden of justification, and he has not met that burden here.
What about principle (3)? Justice Scalia does not discuss it in any detail.
But it is not hard to imagine how clear statement rules might be defended.
Justice Scalia willingly acknowledges that extraordinary acts are not expected
and that courts should not find such acts unless there is clear indication that
they were intended;" 2 this idea is part of a defense of principle (3). Justice
Scalia also insists that courts should try to fit ambiguous texts with the rest of
existing law, and Holy Trinity was written very much in this spirit. 3 And
there is a third possible defense of principle (3); it has to do with the
nondelegation doctrine, whose purpose is to ensure that legislatures, rather than
bureaucracies or courts, actually make the most important decisions of
policy.' 4 Perhaps courts should require Congress-not the executive
branch-to decide, with particularity, if it wants to force judges to resolve a
serious constitutional problem. On this view, vague or general language should
not be taken to require judicial resolution of a hard constitutional judgment;
there is too great a likelihood that, if it is so taken, Congress itself will not
have thought about the constitutional issue at all. Certainly it is most unlikely
101. See the discussion of textual priority in ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 97, at 108-09.
102. See Scalia, supra note 7, at 29.
103. See the reference to background norms in POSNER, supra note 15, at 268-69.




that the Congress that enacted the statute at issue in Holy Trinity actually
decided to apply the ban on importation of labor to churches."'
Of course, the nondelegation doctrine is effectively dead, in part because
courts cannot easily enforce it." But many clear statement principles or
substantive canons-prominently including the principle requiring Congress to
speak clearly if it wants to raise a serious constitutional problem-can be seen
as narrower, more modest, more targeted nondelegation doctrines. The basic
defense of principle (3) is that it has a democracy-forcing character. It requires
the national legislature to make a highly focused decision, reflecting its own
choices about constitutionally sensitive issues. Many substantive canons of
construction have this purpose. They are designed to ensure that the legislature
focuses with particularity on some issue, largely for reasons with roots in the
Constitution, American history, or both. Thus, ambiguous statutes will be read
so as not to preempt state law, or favorably to Native Americans, or so as not
to apply extraterritorially, or favorably to criminal defendants, or so as not to
intrude on the traditional authority of the President.'
We can agree that the statutory text deserves priority over legislative
history and that courts should ordinarily rely on a reasonable understanding of
the text at the time of enactment. But Justice Scalia provides no convincing
argument against principles (1), (2), or (3). A general conclusion follows. Any
approach to statutory interpretation depends on judgments, partly pragmatic
and empirical in nature, about the capacities of both courts and legislatures,
and about the likely effects on both institutions of different interpretive
approaches.' Those who endorse principles (1), (2), and (3), or imaginable
cousins and variations, have to defend those principles against the objection
that they increase uncertainty (thus jeopardizing rule of law values) and also
the number and magnitude of mistakes. Justice Scalia's approach must be
defended not only on the ground that it increases certainty (a reasonable
proposition, though a questionable one if textual ambiguity is pervasive) but
also on the ground that it will not lead to errors that are large in number and
105. Justice Scalia, it will be recalled, see 3upra text accompan. ing notes 30.31. is not L.Oncerned v tth
subjective intentions, and for legitimate reasons I make this point here not to support psychological
investigation but to say that the generality of the statute should not be taken to suggest that the relevant
words, understood tn accordance wtth "objectified intent." would have been understood to apply to churches
within the relevant community--that ts, the ordinary audience ol the statute
106. See Mistretta v. United States. 488 U S 361. 415 (1989) (Scalia. J. dissenting)
107. See the extensive catalogue of background norms and princtples in EsKRtIGE. supra note 4. app
3, at 323-28.
108. This is true for "dynamic interpretation" Should statutory meaning change o%er time' Some
statutory terms seem to invite changes of a sort, and thus Congress sometimes seems to ,.ontemplate
changed readings. Dynamic interpretation, undertaken with regard to statutory purposes, might be justified
as part of the interpretive project, on roughly the same ground as Riggs t Paulier. 22 N E 188 (N Y
1889). See supra text accompanying notes 80-81, 95-101 O1 course a great deal tums on w.hat the statute
actually says. Some statutes, understood in accordance with their original meaning. .,all for dynamic
interpretation; some do not; and sometimes there is no clear understanding one way or the other For
discussions of this, see ESKRIDGE, %upra note 4, at 9-105. and CASS R SUNsTI-LN. AM-'R T'. RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 174-78 (1990).
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serious in magnitude. A good deal turns on the likely performance of courts
and legislatures and on legislators' responsiveness to judicial interpretation.
Justice Scalia has offered only the beginning of a defense in the necessary
terms. He does not show that the actual practices of American courts reveal
systematic abuses of principles (1), (2), and (3). Certainly a more extended
empirical study would be helpful here.
C. A Dog That Did Not Bark: Have Administrative Agencies Become Our
Common Law Courts?
There is a notable and surprising gap in Justice Scalia's argument: the
administrative state. Justice Scalia is, of course, a specialist on administrative
law, whose rise has, in practice, greatly transformed the practice of
interpretation in public law. Most of the key work of statutory interpretation
is done not by courts at all, but by federal agencies. Justice Scalia has also
written an important and illuminating essay 1° 9 on Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,"' which is unquestionably the most
important case about legal interpretation in the last thirty years. Note in this
regard that in its relatively short period on the scene, Chevron, a kind of
counter-Marbury"ll for the administrative state, has been cited more
frequently (3977 times)"l2 than Marbury v. Madison (948 times), Brown v.
Board of Education"13 (1520 times), or Roe v. Wade 14 (1556 times), and
if present trends continue it will soon have been cited more frequently than all
those cases put together. Indeed, Chevron may qualify as the most cited case
in federal courts.
Chevron holds that where statutes are ambiguous, courts should accept any
reasonable interpretation by the agency charged with their implementation." 5
Chevron also appears to accept the legal realist suggestion, central to Justice
Scalia's essay here, that the decision of how to read ambiguities in law
involves no "brooding omnipresence in the sky""' 6 but an emphatically
human judgment about policy or principle. And Chevron concludes, in a way
109. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J, 51 I.
110. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
111. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
112. Quick Cite search of WESTLAW, Allfeds Database (Oct. I, 1997).
113. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
114. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
115. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45. This simplifies some complex issues. For discussion, see I
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & KENNETH CULP DAVIs, ADMINISTRATivE LAWV TREATISE 109-31 (3d ed. 1994);
id. at 147-51, 258-59 (3d ed. Supp. 1996); and Sunstein, Supra note 104.
116. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen. 244 U.S. 205. 222 (1917) (Holmes, ., dissenting). Hence, Chevron
has much in common with Erie Railroad Co v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Both cases involve a
rejection of the view that federal courts could neutrally declare "the law," and both cases, following that
rejection, reallocate legal authority from federal courts to other institutions. For a provocative discussion
of the "Erie effect," see Lawrence Lessig, Erie Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive
Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1797-800 (1997).
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endorsed by Justice Scalia and very much bearing on the democracy prong of
his argument, that where underlying statutes are ambiguous, Congress should
be taken to have decided that agencies are in a better position to make that
judgment than courts." 7 Agencies are in that better position because,
Chevron emphasizes, the President is generally in charge of their policy
judgments, and hence agencies have a kind of democratic pedigree, certainly
a better one than the courts."'S Administrative agencies are, of course,
influenced by shifting political judgments, and their approaches are likely to
reflect the President's basic commitments."'9 I am speaking here of the
comparative advantages of agencies over courts in the interpretation of
ambiguous statutes because of the agencies' greater accountability and their
greater technical specialization. For this reason, agencies are better equipped
to decide on the appropriate definition of vague or ambiguous statutory terms.
An emphasis on these points does not embrace simple majoritarianism, nor
does it neglect the internal morality of democracy, which authorizes courts to
constrain agencies both through clear statement principles' :' and through
constitutional law.'2 ' To say that agencies have comparative advantages in
the interpretation of statutes is to say very little about constitutional
interpretation. The special case for deference to agency interpretations has a
great deal to do with the agency's immersion in technically complex issues, a
consideration that has far less importance in the context of constitutional
law.
122
If this is so, debates over statutory interpretation must include not only
Congress and courts but also administrative agencies, which may be in an
especially good position to carry out the updating and particularizing functions
of common law judges. This is a point missed both by Justice Scalia and by
Judge Calabresi in his vigorous argument for more federal common law.'
117. Technically speaking, Justice Scalia argues-in m) ie conintingl)-hat (heisron is best
taken to hold that the question of delerence will he resolved bN reference to Congrcs's instruttions. that
Congress has not spoken clearly on that subject. and that in light of the *alue ol prosiding a Leiar
background rule, and a reasonable understanding of Congiess's sie\%s about reilevint institutional .paities,
statutes will generally be read to require courts to defer to reasonable agent) interpretations ot la, See
Scalia, supra note 109, at 516
118. The Chevron Court noted that
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people. the Chief Exe.utise i, and it is
entirely appropnate for this political branch of the Go\emient to make su.h polKtt,
choices-resolving the competing interests %%hich Congre.ss itsdlt did not rIsolsc, or
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration ol the statute in
light of everyday realities.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. In some ways. perhaps. agencies hase a stronger demot.rati , pedigree thin
Congress itself, though the Chevron Court did not so argue For an argument to this effe.t, see JERRY
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS. AND GOVERNANCE 131-57 (1997)
119. See generally MASHAW, 3upra note 118. at 106-30
120. See supra text accompanying note 107
121 See infra note 125
122. See infra text accompanying notes 130-144
123. See CALABRESI, supra note I
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Justice Scalia has argued elsewhere that plain text always counts against an
agency interpretation; 24 in his view-consistent with his argument in this
book-Chevron deference is never due to an agency that counteracts text
(defined by reference to ordinary understandings). But perhaps this view is
itself anachronistic. Indeed, we ultimately might conclude that we can obtain
the right mix of democratic and common law virtues if and only if we decide
that the adaptation of statutory text to particular applications (including the
exemption of absurd outcomes), and the use of applicable canons of
construction, is an entirely appropriate administrative task.'1
5
On this view, Holy Trinity might be seen very differently in the context
of the twenty-first century, whose public law would pose as a central question:
What are the views of any agency charged with implementation of this
law?"2 To the suggestion that this position means that some statutes (more
accurately their terms in some applications) might be lost or misdirected as a
result of new agency rulings, a response might be given in Justice Scalia's own
words: "[L]ots of once-heralded programs ought to get lost or misdirected, in
vast hallways or elsewhere. Yesterday's herald is today's bore-although we
judges, in the seclusion of our chambers, may not be at courant enough to
realize it.'
' 27
As against Judge Calabresi's plea for judicial updating, we might claim
that the argument itself needs to be updated: For the most part, appropriate
solutions to the problem of statutory obsolescence should come from
administrative agencies, immersed in the problems at hand and having both
technocratic and democratic virtues as compared to courts. And as against
Justice Scalia, we might urge that administrative agencies should be authorized
to reject the "text" in a way that would go well beyond the common law role
envisaged by Holy Trinity, at least when there is no evidence of a considered
124. See Scalia, supra note 109, at 520.
125. Of course, administrative judgments may be inconsistent with the internal morality of democracy.
If this is so, those judgments may be unconstitutional or interpreted as exceeding statutory authority. See,
e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (interpreting a statute narrowly so as to allow a communist to
travel abroad). My point here is that whatever one's account of democracy, agency adaptation ol text to
circumstance is generally legitimate, at least where there is no clear congressional instruction the other way.
The dictionary definition of the term ought not to be taken to be decisive.
126. Holy Trinity involved the government as prosecutor, see Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 457-58 (1892); hence there would be no deference under ordinary understandings of
the reach of Chevron. But see Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV.
L. REv. 469, 493-506 (1996) (arguing for Chevron deference to the Department of Justice). Even if Holy
Trinity is not itself a case for Chevron deference, other cases involving the molding of text to unanticipated
applications might well be such cases. See, e.g., Babbit v, Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Greater Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2410 (1995) (deferring to agency interpretation of the Endangered Species
Act); Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1992) (literally interpreting the Delaney Clause, which
banned carcinogens in food additives); Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(same).
127. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an E&sential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 897 (1983).
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legislative judgment against the agency's interpretation.'2 ' In modern Holy
Trinity cases, courts would not do the work on their own, but would permit
agencies to engage in a degree of statutory adaptation, not at all on the theory
that agencies can violate the text, but on a finding that agencies reasonably
concluded that despite the generality of the text, there was no considered
legislative judgment that the text should be applied in a way contrary to the
agency's view.
29
Consider, for example, a fairly conventional case, American Mining
Congress v. EPA. 3' Congress had not clearly dealt with the problem of how
to handle materials held for recycling, and the relevant EPA regulation defined
certain materials involved in recycling as "solid waste." In particular, the
regulation said that spent materials, sludges, scrap metal, and the like would
be treated as solid waste if they were not directly reused but were instead held
as part of an industry's ongoing production process."' The EPA reasoned
that materials that were stored, transported, and held for recycling were
associated with the same kinds of environmental harms as materials that were
abandoned or disposed of in some final way. "2 The court of appeals struck
down the EPA regulation on the ground that the governing statute defined solid
waste as "'garbage, refuse, sludge . and other discarded material"';'" for
the court, material held for recycling was not 'discarded."" Citing the
dictionary, the court thought that the "'ordinary plain-English meaning" was
decisive.1 35 If the question was an internal dispute in a court of appeals about
the best interpretation of a statutory term, perhaps the majority would be right.
But the question involved the validity of an EPA regulation, produced after a
complex process involving a number of political interests, an extended process
of intergovernmental deliberation, and an elaborate inquiry into the underlying
issues of substancc. Even if a court would be reluctant to adapt the meaning
of a term like "discarded" to fit with context-even if this is a weaker case
than Holy Trinity for contextual adaptation-is it not hubristic for judges,
unelected and relatively unknowledgeable about the enormously complex
subject at hand, to invoke dictionaries (compiled after all by human beings) to
invalidate executive branch decisions that cannot reasonably be said to run
128. Thus, Sweet Home Chapter can be seen as a case in which an agen',. airmed ith a particular
understanding of the problem at hand and subject to democratic controls, is pemitted to adapt a statutory
term as it sees fit, regardless of what dictionanes say See Sit ert Home Chapter. 115 S Ct at 24 1 N
(referring to agency competence). This is only a possible example because the statutor) term. "ham." might
well be taken as ambiguous. See id. at 2411-18
129. On this view, the cases interpreting the Delaney Clause literally %rec wrongly decided See Le,
968 F.2d at 990; Public Citizen, 831 F.2d at 1123
130. 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
131. See id. at 1179.
132. See id.
133. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1986))
134. Id. at 1185-86
135. Id. at 1184 n.7.
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afoul of any judgment from Congress? The EPA's decision followed a
sustained period of public comment, and undoubtedly the government would
be held accountable for any decision about the reach of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.136 If the EPA's decision runs afoul
of dictionary decisions but of no actual decision by Congress, should it really
be struck down?
Or consider an especially important recent case, upholding the power of
the FDA to regulate tobacco products as "drugs" or "devices. ' 37 The FDA
contended that the current meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 3 " as enacted in 1938, allows it to regulate tobacco products.' At
first glance, it seems clear that in 1938, the terms "drug" and "device" were
not understood to include tobacco products. 4 But might not an executive
agency, subject as it is to political checks and immersed as it is in the
technical details, be entitled to interpret those terms to include tobacco
products in 1997? The statute defines "drug" to include articles "intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals,"''
and it defines "device" to include any "article" that is similarly intended and
that "does not achieve its primary intended purposes" through chemical action
or through being metabolized.' 42 The court held that the FDA could rely on
foreseeability, consumer use, and internal manufacturer memoranda to establish
intended use "to affect the structure or any function of the body.' 1 3 And the
court added that the FDA could conclude that tobacco products contain "device
components" designed to ensure an (admittedly indirect) effect on the structure
or function of the body.'" What is striking about the court's conclusions is
that they were based not on the ordinary understanding of the statutory terms
at the time of enactment, but on the agency's authority to interpret those terms
in a way consistent with (what accountable and informed officials could
conclude is) their current meaning.
Without attempting to resolve the underlying issues here, I think that the
court's decision is reasonable and probably correct. To be sure, the original
meaning of "drug" and "device" may not, to the relevant community, have
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
137. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
138. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994).
139. See Coyne Bealun, 966 F. Supp. at 1379 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)-(h)).
140. The qualification "at first glance" is necessary because it is unclear whether the community would
take Congress to have referred to existing understandings of what count as drugs and devices or to have
set out a general concept whose particular content would or should vary over time, with new understandings
of fact and value. If the second view is correct, then Coyne Beahmn is rightly decided even under Justice
Scalia's view of interpretation. What I am suggesting here is that the case is probably right even if the first
view is correct. In reality it is unlikely that there was a general understanding one way or the other.
141. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(l)(c).
142. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(3).
143. Coyne Bealun, 966 F. Supp. at 1389-91.
144. Id. at 1394.
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included tobacco products.4 5 But Congress enacted general terms, not its
particular understandings of what those terms meant. And in view of new
judgments about relevant facts and belief-influenced changes in values, it
seems appropriate to allow a specialized agency, accountable as it is to
political forces, to interpret these (general and ambiguous) terms as it did in
1997. There can be little doubt that the FDA's decision was a product of a set
of legitimate political influences and that it emerged after a sustained period
of highly visible deliberation on the issues at hand, with involvement from the
President himself. And, of course, Congress can override the interpretation if
it chooses.
A broader conclusion follows. It is one thing to say that courts should be
permitted to reject original meaning in favor of current meaning' it is quite
another thing to say that agencies, with their comparative advantages, should
be permitted to do precisely that. These are separate debates, and it is possible
to resolve the first question against the courts while at the same time resolving
the second question in favor of the agencies."' What is disappointing is that
Justice Scalia does not discuss these issues, which link his interests in statutory
interpretation and administrative law, and which cast a new light on the court-
legislature interactions that concern him here.
D. An Analogy
Allowing appropriate adjustments for administrative law, we can better
understand statutory interpretation if we borrow from the law of contract. It is
now familiar to see contract law as consisting largely of default rules,
specifying how to understand gaps or silences from the parties and also how
to understand provisions that seem vague or ambiguous. '  The law of
contract contains three kinds of default rules. First, some default rules are
designed to find out the instructions of the parties. What would they have
done, if they had made provision on the point? Such default rules are market-
mimicking."4 8 Second, some default rules are designed not to implement the
parties' will, but to impose on the party who can do so most cheaply the
incentive to make a clear provision on the point.' Default rules of this kind
145. An underlying issue is that sometimes Congress enacts a geneial tcm. ha'.inC a paxii.ular
understanding of the term's meaning, but with a complementary understanding that the meaning ,l the term
may and should shift over time; consider the terms "public polic%" "reasonable.' and * p,.Lhopatht. " See
ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 61-64; SUNSTEIN, 3upra note i0s, at 174.7h
146. It follows that the enterprise of translation might %ell be permissible lot agenties shether or not
it is permissible for the courts. See generally Lessig. 3upra note 53 targuing 101 insiati0 Of LUitsttutinal
meaning).
147. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contrat t3 An Et ononut Thr ot of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J 87 (1989)
148. See id. at 97-100.
149. See id.; see also U.C.C § 2-201 (1989) (setting iorh the statute of Iraudsi, Jesien % Ashland.
281 N.W.2d 210 (Neb. 1979) (applying the statute oi Irauds)
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are information-eliciting, intended not to mimic the parties' wishes but to make
sure that those wishes are made clear by the parties themselves. It also seems
clear how to choose between market-mimicking and information-eliciting
default rules. If the court is clear on what the market-mimicking rule is, it
should choose that rule. But if the court is unsure on that question-if the
costs of decision and costs of error for the judge seeking to discern the market
mimicking rule are very high-the court might do better to impose an
information-eliciting default, designed to penalize the party in the best position
to make explicit provision for the matter at hand.
Courts also have a third kind of default rule. Some such rules are based
on considerations of public policy that have little or nothing to do with
implementing or eliciting the parties' instructions.' Such considerations
might involve, for example, the protection of third parties, or they might be
intended to shift the parties' preferences and values in a certain direction.
Much of legal interpretation is, or is about, default rules.'5 Now, it may
be tempting to suppose that federal courts, lacking common law authority,
ought not to use such rules, and that statutory construction should proceed
without them. But a moment's reflection should show that statutory default
rules, in some form, are not so much desirable as inevitable. As the law of
contract helps reveal, words cannot have meaning without background
understandings of various sorts. Usually those understandings are so taken for
granted, so highly internalized, that they seem invisible, and part of the
necessary meaning of words. But they are nonetheless in place; they make
communication possible. And often legal interpretation is possible only because
of background principles or rules, some of them so taken for granted that they
are invisible, some of them contested enough to be visible but not highly
controversial, some of them at the heart of spirited debates in public law. If,
for example, a federal statute does not say whether state law is preempted,
what happens? If a statute is silent on the existence of private rights of action,
do such rights exist? A default rule, principle, or presumption is necessary one
way or the other. The legal system cannot proceed without them. The question
is not whether to have statutory default rules but which statutory default rules
to have.
Some default rules152 may be designed to find out the legislature's actual
150. See, e.g., Petermann v. Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that "in order
to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the
employer his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose employment is for a unspecilied
duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the employee's refusal to commit perjury").
151. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. R V.
405, 453-54 (1989).
152. As the previous paragraph suggests, the term "rules" is not entirely accurate. Sometimes the
background understandings operate as presumptions or principles, not as rules. I use the term "rules" as




instructions. Such rules are the analogue, in statutory interpretation, of market-
mimicking default rules. But statutory default rules might also operate to elicit
information, with the purpose of encouraging Congress to act in a certain way,
by creating appropriate incentives. Courts might, for example, ask which party
is in the best position to correct any errors in Congress or ask which approach
is likely to ensure that Congress will legislate clearly. Some of Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence is best understood as a series of information-eliciting default
rules. Textualism itself has, as part of its defense, the idea that it will
encourage Congress to state its will clearly. Similarly, the ban on use of
legislative history imposes on Congress an incentive to say what it means in
the constitutionally favored form. We can also understand some statutory
default rules as having purposes not involving congressional instructions; these
are the analogue to "public policy" defaults in the law of contract. Consider
the ideas that statutes will be construed favorably to Native Americans, t '
that statutes will be construed so as not to raise constitutional doubts,"' and
that statutes will be construed so as not to preempt state law.'"
Justice Scalia is, as noted, skeptical of these kinds of interpretive
principles, on the ground that they have unclear foundations in sources external
to judicial will and are too likely to represent some judicial "power-grab." "
t
But some such principles are inevitable, and in any case Justice Scalia is not
at all skeptical of the crucially important idea that statutory ambiguities will
be resolved by the agency charged with implementing the relevant statute,"'
nor is he unwilling to qualify that very principle by reference to some clear
statement principles that operate as information-eliciting defaults.'5 The
contract law analogy shows that terms have no meaning without default rules
and that there is a place for default rules that serve purposes external to the
will of the parties; it also helps us disentangle the diverse functions of the
interpretive principles favored or, for that matter, disfavored by Justice Scalia.
In any case much work remains to be done on the relationship between default
rules in contract law and default rules in the law of statutory interpretation. '
153. See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U S 759. 766 (1985)
154. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Flonda Gulf Coast Bldg & Consir Tra des Council. 485
U.S. 568, 574 (1988).
155. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v Isla Petroleum Corp. 485 U S 495. 503
(1988).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
157. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S 421. 453-55 (1987) (Scalia. J . concumng)
158. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 US. 244. 259-60 (1991) (Sc -ia, J. concurring)
(invoking a clear statement pnnciple against the extratemtonal application of American law.
notwithstanding the view of the relevant agency),
159. I am grateful to Richard Craswell and Einer Elhague for valuable discussion of the analogy
between contractual and statutory default rules
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III. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW
Justice Scalia's attack on a version of common law constitutionalism, in
favor of a species of originalism, raises a number of questions, and I will
attend to only a few of them here. 6
A. Originalisms
Are we all originalists now? In the commentaries in this book, Ronald
Dworkin 6' and Laurence Tribe 62 write as originalists, and with suitable
qualifications, most of their work can fly comfortably under the originalist
banner. For most participants in the continuing debates, the question is
emphatically not whether the original understanding is controlling; it is how
the original understanding is best understood. Some people think that the
original understanding is best taken as setting out abstract moral principles.'63
Others think that the original understanding points to abstract
principles' 6 -in the context of the ban on cruel and unusual punishment, for
example, it "'forbid[s] whatever punishments are in fact cruel and
unusual."" 65 Still others think that however the original understanding is
described, its provisions must be "translated" in order to be applied to new
problems. 66
Justice Scalia claims that he does take the Constitution to embody
"abstract principles." What it sets forth "is not a moral principle of 'cruelty'
that philosophers can play with in the future, but rather the existing society's
assessment of what is cruel."'' 67 Thus, the Eighth Amendment is to be
understood not by "'what we consider cruel today"' but instead by "the moral
perceptions of the time." ' 8 Of course, this formulation raises many
160. Thus I do not discuss, except in passing, the following questions: (1) Is Justice Scalia a good
originalist? (2) Did the Framers understand constitutional interpretation in originalist terms, or did they
favor some other method? (3) Is it appropriate for an originalist to focus on the particular expectations the
original community had of a provision's reach, or should originalists look elsewhere?
161. See Ronald Dworkin, Cormnent, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 115.
162. See Tribe, supra note 37.
163. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 161, at 115, 126.
164. Dworkin, who says that he is a "semantic originalist," is interested in what the Constitution
"says," and claims that what it "says" is a matter of abstract principles. See id. at 119, 122, 126. But what
it "says" is a function of our account of interpretation, and it does not contain abstract principles unless we
have decided, according to our (pre- or extra-semantic) account, that it should do so. Thus, Dworkin's
approach, insofar as it is about judicial review, must be rooted in arguments about institutional capacities.
Dworkin expressly recognizes this point and makes some such arguments. See DwORKIN, supra note 57,
at 373-79.
165. Scalia, supra note 37, at 145 (discussing Dworkin's method of analysis and quoting Dworkin,
supra note 161, at 115, 120).
166. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV.
125, 131-35.




questions. How do we characterize the moral perception of the time9 At what
level of abstraction? Apparently Justice Scalia believes that it must be
characterized at a relatively low level of abstraction; his claim that the death
penalty cannot possibly violate the Eighth Amendment's *'abstract moral
principle"'69 appears to be rooted in the fact that the moral prnciple held by
the founding generation did not appear, to the Founding generation, to forbid
the death penalty. But this raises many further questions. Does it follow that
the Equal Protection Clause permits school segregation*? That the national
government, not bound by the Equal Protection Clause, can discriminate
however it wishes? That the First Amendment does not disturb the common
law of libel?
Justice Scalia does not answer these questions. I emphasize this point not
to say that the originalist will necessarily arrive at unacceptable results," ' but
to suggest that there is not one kind of (canonical) originalism but a wide
range of (plausible) originalisms. Justice Scalia has not adequately defended
the particular kind that he favors.
B. Originalism and Stare Decisis
There is a pervasive problem for originalists: how to handle precedents
that depart from originalism. In many areas of constitutional law, onginalism
as Justice Scalia understands it has been repudiated for a fairly long time, and
key provisions now mean something other than what, on Justice Scalia's
version of originalism, they were originally understood to mean. The question
goes to the heart of the relationship between the Constitution and the common
law method. Common law lawyers rely heavily on the doctrine of stare decisis;
it is a foundation of their method. How should those skeptical of common law
constitutionalism deal with the resulting doctnne?
Commenting in this volume, Professor Tribe argues that Justice Scalia is
not really an originalist at all. Tribe objects that in several First Amendment
cases (involving flag burning. cross burning,": and animal
sacrifice173 ), Justice Scalia has voted to strike down statutes not inconsistent
with the original understanding, narrowly understood.'" But Justice Scalia
acknowledges the problem. He answers that his votes are attributable not to a
belief that the First Amendment sets out aspirations whose content changes
over time, but to the unblinkable fact that for the First Amendment "the Court
has developed long-standing and well-accepted principles (not out of accord
169. Id.
170. See infra notes 194-196 and accompanying text
171. See Texas v Johnson. 491 U S 397 (1989)
172. See R.A.V v. Cin of St Paul. 505 U S 377 (19921
173. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ave. Inc v City ol Hialeah. 508 .S 520 14,93)
174. See Tribe, 3upra note 37. at 80-81
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with the general practices of our people, whether or not they were
constitutionally required as an original matter) that are effectively
irreversible.' The point of originalism is thus not to "roll[] back...
accepted old principles of constitutional law" but to reject "usurpatious new
ones."'' 7  Justice Scalia explains in this fashion his recent votes against
"novel constitutional rights"-the right against excessive damage awards,'7
the right against being excluded from government contracts because of party
affiliation,'78  and the novel constitutional ban on some single-sex
schooling.
79
Now, this is a large problem, faced in some form by every Justice, and
Justice Scalia cannot be faulted for failing to resolve it in a brief essay and an
even briefer reply to critics. But the difficulty with his claim here is that it is
very hard to know when an originalist judge, concerned to respect precedent,
is applying "accepted old principles" or instead creating "new constitutional
rights." Would it not be equally plausible to say that in the nonoriginalist
judgments that Justice Scalia joined the Court created new rights, for example
the right to bum the flag and the cross, and the right to sacrifice animals?
Would it not be plausible to say that in the judgments from which Justice
Scalia dissented, 8° the Court largely applied principles developed in older
cases forbidding government from using outmoded sex stereotypes as a basis
for segregating schools"' or from conditioning employment on party
affiliation?'
2
To answer these questions, everything depends on the level of generality
at which old principles or new rights are described. The precedents in such
areas as sex equality are well-entrenched, and Justice Scalia offers no basis on
which to distinguish between a refusal to create "new rights" and a willingness
to follow "old principles." There is also a risk that the originalist judge,
refusing to extend the principles reflected in old cases, will ensure incoherence
in the law, and thus a form of unfairness, since similarly situated people will
not be treated similarly. This might be referred to as the Bowers v.
Hardwick'83 problem: "Thus far and no more!" does not produce much
175. Scalia, supra note 37, at 138. It is worthwhile to note that there are two points here: judicial
understandings and consistency with "general practices of our people," a notion that raises questions of its
own.
176. Id. at 139.
177. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1610-14 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353, 2361-74 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
179. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2291-309 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. See, e.g., O'Hare Truck Sent., Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 2361-74 (1996) (Scalia J., dissenting); United
States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2291-309 (1996) (Scalia J., dissenting).
181. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
182. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).




coherence in the law.' 4  Perhaps this sacrifice is inevitable and
worthwhile-if it is the only way to restore judicial legitimacy without
renovating existing law-but it creates problems of its own. To decide whether
the resulting incoherence, and dissimilar treatment of the similarly situated, are
worthwhile, it is necessary to balance the extent of the unfairness against the
value of preventing further mistakes. This is a large problem, faced by anyone
with confidence in a particular method of interpretation, and I cannot resolve
it here.
C. Why (and Which) Originalism ?
As Justice Scalia knows and acknowledges, the original understanding
cannot be decisive simply because it was the original understanding. A defense
of using the original understanding must itself be independent of the original
understanding and thus must be made out in terms of political theory and good
empirical assessments of institutional competence.t8 5 Lawyers cannot defend
use of the original understanding, let alone any particular species of
originalism, by reference to history. (Nor can they defend an approach other
than Justice Scalia's by reference to originalism.) The question of whether the
original understanding of an old text should bind current generations is not at
all simple-why on earth should current Americans be bound by some
understandings of some votes by some segment of the citizenry over two
centuries ago?' 8 -- and a reference to "democracy," though a good start,
cannot provide the necessary legitimation.
Justice Scalia suggests that his version of originalism will limit the
policymaking authority of federal judges, and this is very plausibly true. But
he also 5uggests-and this is mostly how he makes his argument-that judges
have only two real alternatives: Follow the original understanding as he
understands it or basically do whatever they want. This is implausible. Both
originalist and nonoriginalist judges come in many different stripes, and the
184. I am pointing here to violations of integrity, as Dworkin understands that ideal See DwORK,
supra note 57, at 176-224.
185. Justice Scalia sees this point and refers to separation of powers. see Scalia. supra note 7. at 9.
and to democracy, see id. at 9-12. These are certainly good places to start, but as we will see they are no
more than that. It is necessary to specify these concepts in order to get them to do the necessary work. and
the ideal of democracy by itself does not support originalism or a constrained judicial role See MASHAW.
supra note 118, at 201-02 (discussing flaws in the usual presentation of the countermajontanan difficulty)
This ideal is too abstract and contested to support a particular view of interpretation, and. for reasons
suggested below, see infra text accompanying notes 189-193, once specified, the ideal is best understood
to allow courts a modest but hardly trivial role.
186. Of course, the ratiflers excluded all women and most African Americans In fact. the question
why the Constitution itself is binding is not entirely simple. To say that it is not simple is not to suggest
that we should not take it to be binding; undoubtedly we should, partly for simple, pragmatic reasons See
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITtTION 93-102 (1993). But the mix of argumer.ts that make the
Constitution binding do not make the original understanding, as Justice Scalia would describe it. binding
See id.
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distinctions among them require a good deal of attention. Since Justice Scalia
describes the alternative to his brand of originalism as free floating
constitutional creativity, the discussion is unduly loaded from the beginning.
The debate over methods of constitutional interpretation cannot sensibly be
resolved by suggesting that anyone who disagrees is inviting judges to rule as
they wish.
Let us imagine some more reasonable alternative positions. We can
imagine judges who care a great deal about history, but who explore history
to identify not particular understandings of particular problems, but overall
goals and purposes. We can imagine judges who think, for example, that the
First Amendment, understood in light of its historical roots, is centered above
all on the preconditions for democratic self-government,'87 and that this idea
calls for some particular results contrary to the originalist understanding-for
example limits on use of the law of libel by public officials. We can imagine
judges who think that interpretation calls for something like an act of
translation to accommodate new circumstances, including unforeseen
developments not only of fact but also of value. 8 8 Attentive to issues of
democratic theory and the rule of law, such judges may well try to devise
strategies to reduce their own discretion and policymaking authority. They
might, for example, care a great deal about precedent, using previous holdings
and rationales to discipline their own discretion. They might also think that
courts should be reluctant to invalidate outcomes of electoral processes unless
it is very clear that something has gone wrong.
Such judges might emphasize-and this is particularly important-that the
case for judicial intrusion is strongest, under an ambiguous constitutional
provision, when there is some defect in the process of democratic deliberation
that gave rise to the relevant law.'89 Despite Justice Scalia's presentation
here, democracy should not be identified with the outcomes of majoritarian
politics; it is no mere statistical affair. Whatever emerges from a particular
political process should not be identified with the ideal itself.9 ' Democracy
comes equipped with its own internal morality,'9' which constrains what a
187. See Justice Breyer's suggestion to this effect in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 117
S. Ct. 1174, 1204 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
188. See generally Lessig, supra note 53.
189. Of course, JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980), is the classic statement of this
position.
190. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRms 274-86 (William Rehg trans., 1996). For
relevant work from quite different angles, see AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY (Naomi
Goldblum trans., 1996), which suggests that a decent society ensures that its own citizens will not be
"humiliated" by official institutions; and MASHAW, supra note 118, at 202, which suggests that "a
moment's reflection on the teaching of voting theory makes clear that whatever the difficulty with judicial
review, countermajoritanism is an odd way to put the problem." Margalit's suggested ban on official
humiliation might well be taken to be part of democracy's internal morality. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 116 S.
Ct. 1620 (1996) (holding that an amendment to the Colorado Constitution denying legislative, judicial, and
executive antidiscrimination protection to homosexuals violated the Equal Protection Clause).
191. See HABERMAS, supra note 190, at 274-86; SUNSTEIN, supra note 186, at 162-94.
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majority may do, consistent with the commitment to democracy. A majority
may not, for example, disenfranchise people, impose a regime of political
inequality, or act solely on the basis of contempt for fellow citizens.'
Judges of this kind come in many shapes and sizes; they might well think
of themselves as originalists. What matters is that such judges are much
influenced by the common law tradition, and it is by no means clear that
judges of that kind have less legitimacy or are worse than oiginalist judges of
the kind that Justice Scalia favors. A federal judiciary that proceeds in
common law fashion and that treats constitutional rights as aspirations (given
content by concrete cases and invoked sparingly to invalidate the outcomes of
ordinary politics) might well, because of its very insulation, produce a better
system of constitutional democracy. It might do so because it has certain
advantages in deliberating on questions of basic justice,' or-in my view
far more likely-it might do so because and to the extent that it focuses on
ensuring the preconditions for a well-functioning democratic regime. Justice
Scalia thinks that, even if this is true, a judicial role of this kind is
fundamentally illegitimate and without authority, because it is not authorized
by the Constitution. But the Constitution does not set out the principles
governing its own interpretation; certainly the Constitution itself does not
contain an interpretive principle of originalism. Any judgment about the
appropriate content of governing interpretive principles must invoke not the
Constitution but political theory of some kind. The claim that the text must be
interpreted in light of the original understanding as Justice Scalia conceives it
is not an implausible argument. But it depends both on contested ideals and on
highly contingent and largely empirical claims about what system of
interpretation is likely to be or to do best, all things considered.
For America, what system of interpretation would in fact be or do best?
The past offers no clear answer, but it is a good place to start. It is highly
relevant that an originalist approach of the sort favored by Justice Scalia would
have very dramatic consequences (not acknowledged or discussed in his
essay). 94 Such an approach may well, for example, mean that Brown v.
Board of Education,'95 the cornerstone of modem equal protection doctrine,
is wrong; that New York Timres Co. v. Sullivan,'" the cornerstone of modern
free speech doctrine, is also wrong; that the Establishment Clause does not
192. This latter point underlies Romer v. Evans, 116 S Ct at 1627. see also Cass R Sunsteim. The
Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided. 110 HARv L Riv 4. 59-64 t1996)
193. See BICKEL, supra note 57, at 23-28. A more recent version of the argument can be found in
DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 373-79.
194. I am not arguing that originalism of the form that Justice Scalia defends would inevitably produce
these outcomes. I am only suggesting that it is a serious possibility There are continuing disputes about
whether originalism would support outcomes of the kind discussed in the text, and a possible reaction to
those debates is that often the historical materials leave ambiguities or gaps and nonhitstoncal judgments
must be used, and are being used, to resolve the ambiguities
195. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
196. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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apply to the states; that affirmative action raises no serious issue; that the
federal government can discriminate on the basis of race and sex however it
wishes; that nearly all sex discrimination by the states is unobjectionable; that
compulsory school prayer is constitutionally acceptable; that, in short, most of
modern constitutional law, now taken as constitutive of the American
constitutional tradition by Americans and non-Americans alike, now taken as
symbolic of our nation's commitment to liberty under law, and, for the last
decade in particular an inspiration for constitution-making and constitution-
building all over the globe, is illegitimate and fatally undemocratic. An
approach that leads to conclusions of this kind may not be disqualified for that
reason, but these possibilities show that slippery slope arguments can work in
both directions.
Justice Scalia may believe that consequences are irrelevant. 97 It is
tempting to think that the choice among interpretive approaches should not
depend on outcomes; an important guarantee of neutrality might even be found
in indifference to outcomes. But I think that this is a confusion. There is this
much to be said for indifference to outcomes: Once an interpretive approach
has been properly selected, it should not be abandoned simply because it
produces a bad outcome. But any approach to interpretation must be defended
partly by reference to its consequences, broadly conceived, and the set of
relevant consequences includes emphatically its effects on human liberty and
equality. No approach to interpretation can be defended without reference to
the human interests that it affects. If consequences, broadly conceived,198 do
not matter, what does?
My central point is that other approaches to interpretation, whether or in
whatever sense originalist, can accommodate our constitutional tradition as it
has come to be understood without, at the same time, authorizing judges to do
whatever they want. Justice Scalia is correct to say that common law thinking
lies at the heart of American constitutional law.' 99 But this way of thinking
should be seen as part of judicial modesty, not judicial hubris. Certainly it
allows for a degree of flexibility. But it also comes with its own constraints on
judicial power, brought about through the doctrine of stare decisis, close
197. He may also believe that the results, to the extent they are objectionable, would find a legislative
remedy. If this is so, his argument would be much strengthened, but there is little reason to believe that
this is the case.
198. Of course, I do not suggest that consequences must be understood in utilitarian terms. A claim
about consequences might be made out in terms of democracy, protection of basic rights, promotion of
human capabilities and functionings, and much more.
199. It is important to emphasize that judicial discretion cannot be eliminated by the interpretive
methods of civil law courts, or even by formalism, which will inevitably leave gaps. Indeed, there is a
substantial overlap between the interpretive practices of common law and civil law courts, which use
similar presumptions and canons, linguistical and substantive. See Summers & Taruffo, supra note 73. For
a discussion comparing European civil lawyers to American lawyers, see Mary Ann Glendon, Comment,
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 6, at 95 passim.
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attention to the details of cases,2°' and a general reluctance to issue rules that
depart much from the facts of particular disputes. It is part and parcel of the
judiciary's distrust of large theories and its ordinary search for concrete
outcomes and cautious principles on which theoretically diverse judges may
agree. 2° Common law thinking is even connected with the Supreme Court's
general and entirely appropriate reluctance to disturb the outcomes of political
processes. To the extent that it partakes of ambitious theories at all, common
law thinking, in its current incarnation in American public law, largely
attempts to protect the workings of a well-functioning system of democratic
deliberation. Of course, courts with the abilities of "broken-field runners" may
be able to circumvent these constraints on judicial discretion. There are no
guarantees here. All I mean to suggest is that the obligation to respect
precedent and to proceed cautiously tend, in practice, to make constitutional
law in its common law incarnation more open-ended than it might appear, even
if less open-ended than those fearful of judicial discretion would wish.
From the standpoint of promoting democratic ideals, it is hardly clear that
Justice Scalia's form of originalism is preferable. I have said that the choice
of an approach to interpretation requires a judgment about political theory, and
that means that the choice requires the specification of the right content of the
democratic ideal. If democracy is not identified with the outcomes of
majoritarian politics, and if its internal morality constrains what majorities may
do, the American constitutional tradition has converged on an alternative far
superior to Justice Scalia's approach. 2 2 From the standpoint of constraining
judicial discretion, the common law method of constitutional law, properly
understood, is at least a plausible competitor to Justice Scalia's form of
originalism, in light of the many difficult questions that historical inquiry
leaves unresolved and the difficulty of matching that form of originalism with
a theory of stare decisis. If we are concerned about limiting judicial intrusions
into politics, Justice Scalia's form of originalism may well be inferior to our
tradition in its modemn incarnation. 23 That form of originalism is probably
better at promoting predictability and stability. But these are hardly decisive
virtues, and it is not clear that there is any other dimension along which Justice
Scalia's approach is preferable to the serious alternatives.
200. Cf. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, Case-Based Deciion Theonr. 110 Q J EcoN 605 (1995)
(arguing that people commonly select particular acts based on buch acts" perlormance in simtlar
circumstances).
201. See CASS R. SuNsTEN, LEGAL REAsoNLNG ANt) POLTICAL CONi-LICT 35-61 (996). c-f Strauss.
supra note 5, at 926-28 (discussing how common law constituttonalhsm influences judicial restruint)
202. Of course, there are questions about how to identify democracy's internal moralty. and it Judges
were incompetent at that task, it might make sense to adopt Justice Scahia', form ol onginrlism
203. Recall that Justice Scalia thinks that his form of onginalism would doom ar more legtshition thin
the current approach, in areas involving property rights, Second Amendment rights, and Confrontation
Clause rights. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51
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IV. CONCLUSION
The distinctive virtues of the common law stem from the relative
independence of common law judges, their caution about high theory, and their
intense focus on particulars. These virtues allow a high degree of flexibility
over diverse circumstances, prominently including those produced by new facts
and values. These virtues are inseparable from the distinctive vices of the
common law: its imperfectly democratic character, its lack of theoretical
ambition, and its particularity, which may impede planning and lead to
unfairness because the similarly situated are not treated similarly and because
the judges' own judgments of value or fact play an excessive role. An effort
to evaluate the place of common law thinking would do well to come to terms
with the realities of the modem state, prominently including the large role of
regulatory agencies, which engage in statutory interpretation far more
frequently, and with far larger consequences, than do federal courts.
Administrative agencies are law-interpreters, both in fact and in law, and it is
striking that modern theories of statutory interpretation rarely come to terms
with that phenomenon."
Justice Scalia's approach to interpretation-democratic formalism-has
two foundations: a strong commitment to rule-bound justice and a desire to
ensure that discretion is exercised by democratically elected officials rather
than by judges. Hence his overriding goal is to exorcise the common law from
public law. He is correct to emphasize the common law heritage of the
American legal tradition and much of modern public law: judicial treatment of
many statutes as standards rather than rules; doctrines of interpretation that
operate as standards or factors; and, perhaps above all, a system of case-based
constitutional law that owes a great deal to the common law heritage. 5
Many observers, above all Judge Calabresi, have celebrated common law
methods and sought to reintroduce the virtues of common law judgment into
a regulatory state founded mostly on statutory enactments. Justice Scalia's goal
is the opposite: to reduce particularity in the hope that it will increase
predictability, constrain the abusive exercise of discretion by judges, and
increase democratic self-government by imposing good incentives on Congress.
Others might urge courts to make regulatory agencies a central ingredient
in their theory of interpretation, on the theory that the traditional common law
role of courts would be best carried out by administrative agencies authorized
to make sense of statutory text2" when new applications arise, or when facts
204. This is a gap not only in Justice Scalia's essay, but also in DWORKIN, supra note 57. The
administrative state has yet to be introduced into general accounts of legal interpretation. Here there is a
great deal of room for positive and normative work.
205. See Strauss, supra note 5, for the best discussion of the way in which the common law explains
and justifies current American constitutional law.
206. Of course, this claim does not mean that agencies may violate statutes. The claim is intended to
allow agencies to handle ambiguities and excessive generality, subject, of course, to judicially administered
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and values change. This is an approach toward which I have gestured in this
Book Review, on the ground that it has the virtue of fitting nicely with the
needs, values, and actual practices of modem government. Thus, I have
attempted to sketch an alternative approach to interpretation, one that also
places a premium on democratic values and that uses clear statement
principles, agency interpretations, and democratic ideals to supplement and
occasionally countermand the text as understood at the time of enactment. In
statutory interpretation, this approach would allow regulatory agencies some
room to adapt text to particular circumstances and would authorize courts,
supplementing that agency role, to use canons and presumptions to make sense
rather than nonsense out of the statutory law. In constitutional interpretation,
this approach would combine a large dose of judicial modesty, favoring
incompletely theorized agreements, with an occasional willingness to invoke
the internal morality of democracy to look skeptically at laws that compromise
the political process or attempt to impose second-class citizenship on members
of disadvantaged social groups. My suggestion is that an approach of this sort
would do far better than democratic formalism from the democratic point of
view, that it would impose sufficient constraints on judicial power and judicial
discretion, and that its only comparative defect, a modest one, is that it may
suffer along the dimension of promoting predictability.
There is nothing wrong with Justice Scalia's arguments in the abstract. In
an imaginable world, not unrecognizably far from our own, some or all of
those arguments might become convincing. But there is also nothing right
about Justice Scalia's arguments in the abstract. Whether those arguments are
convincing depends on a range of practical and predictive judgments about the
capacities of different governmental institutions. Justice Scalia does not defend
the necessary practical or predictive judgments or even identify them as such.
He writes instead as if his particular, sometimes radical, conclusions can be
grounded in apocalyptic arguments about the slippery slope 7 and in high-
sounding abstractions about democracy.
It is to Justice Scalia's credit that he has laid out an approach to
interpretation with a high degree of clarity and coherence. It is to his credit too
that he has sketched an approach to interpretation that might make sense in
some imaginable world. What he has not shown is that it makes sense in ours.
clear statement principles. For an example of restrictions on igenc) interprct,%e pocrl.. see EEOC
Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257-59 (1991). which uss 1a preumption igatnst extraterritorial
application of national law to trump an agency's \i'e\
207. For example, Justice Scalia writes.
If the courts are free to write the Constitution ane'%. they %,ill. by God. %%rite it the %% ,a the
majority wants . . . This, of course, is the end of the Bill of Rights. % hosc mea±ning ',ill bi
committed to the very body it was meant to protect aginst the majority By ti) ing to make the
Constitution do everything that needs doing from age it ige. we shAll hi ie ,.auscd it to do
nothing at all.
Scalia, supra note 7, at 47.
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